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The decision in HJ and HT was a landmark moment in the treatment of sexual minority 
asylum seekers by the UK.1 In ringing the death knell of the much-maligned ‘discretion test’, 
the judgement has been heralded as a ‘key factor in the improvement of first decisions’.2 
However, implementation of the decision has not been without issues. As Millbank3 and 
Chelvan4 predicted, the decision has placed greater emphasis on asylum seekers to prove 
their sexual identity.5 This is borne out in the fact that 86% of rejections in 2013 were based, 
at least in part, on adverse credibility findings.6 
 This chapter employs a queer theoretical framework applying it to existing academic 
literature and judgements of the Court of Appeal and Upper Tribunal to interrogate the 
methods through which the ‘legal truth’ of asylum seekers’ sexual identities is produced. 7  
Building on Raj’s observations8 regarding the anxiety those administrating the asylum 
apparatus9 feel towards the potential for false claims, I undertake a deconstructive analysis of 
                                                          
1 HJ (Iran) and HT (Cameroon) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] UKSC 31, [2011] 1 AC 
596. 
2 UK Lesbian and Gay Immigration Group, ‘Missing the Mark’ (Unison 2013) <https://uklgig.org.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2014/02/Missing-the-Mark.pdf> accessed 12th December 2017.  
3 Jenni Millbank, ‘From Discretion to Disbelief: Recent Trends in Refugee Determinations on the Basis of 
Sexual Orientation in Australia and the United Kingdom’ (2009) 13 The International Journal of Human Rights 
391, 391-414. 
4 S Chelvan, ‘Put Your Hands Up (If you Feel Love)’ (2011) 25 Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Law 56, 
57.  
5 See: Orientation, Behaviour, Identity section for an explanation of why I have adopted the concept of sexual 
identity.  
6 UK Lesbian and Gay Immigration Group, ‘Missing the Mark’ (Unison 2013) <https://uklgig.org.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2014/02/Missing-the-Mark.pdf> accessed 12th December 2017.  
7 For a discussion of the term legal truth see generally: See: Leslie Moran, ‘The Homosexual(ity) of Law’ 
(Routledge 1996) 11.   
8 See Generally: Senthorun Raj, ‘Affective Displacements: Understanding Emotions and Sexualities in Refugee 
Law’ (2011) 36 Alternative Law Journal 177; Senthorun Raj, ‘Queering Fears: Pro-LGBTI Refugee Cases’ in 
Chris Ashford, Alan Reed and Nicola Wake ‘Legal Perspectives on State Power: Consent and Control’ 
(Cambridge Scholars Publishing 2016) 126; 147-148; Senthoran Raj, ‘A/Effective Adjudications: Queer 
Refugees and the Law’ (2017) 38:4 Journal of Intercultural Studies 453.  
9 For a discussion of the term apparatus see Giorgio Agamben, ‘What is apparatus? And Other Essays’ 
(Stanford University Press 2009) 2-3.  
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the methods through which law authenticates ‘credible’ identity performances. By doing this, 
I locate the discursive formations on which decision-makers’ understandings of sexual 
identity rest. Thus, enabling me to illuminate the flawed reasoning of credibility 
determinations within sexual identity based claims.  
The core themes underlying these determinations are then grouped together under the 
headings ‘born-this-way’ relating to the need for claimants’ orientations and behaviours to 
have formed into coherent identities; ‘I’m coming out (I want the world to know)’ relating to 
the requirement on asylum seekers to visibly manifest their sexual identity; and ‘I kissed a 
girl and I liked it’ relating to the need for asylum seekers sexual behaviours’ to correlate to 
their proclaimed identity.  
Unpacking Queer 
The term ‘queer’ is applied in numerous contexts, with different meanings intended by its 
user depending on their political orientation. For example, in the title of Hathaway and 
Pobjoy’s ‘Queer cases make bad law’,10 queer calls attention to the unusual composition of 
the judgement in HT and HJ.11 With Hathaway and Pojboy seeking to pinpoint the ‘strange’ 
nature of a decision which—in their view—disrupts the coherence of international refugee 
law.12 Although my usage of the term is very much divorced from theirs, there is a common 
thread in the idea of disrupting disciplinary coherence. My understanding of queer draws on 
the work of Halberstam who argues that:  
A queer methodology, in a way, is a scavenger methodology that uses different 
methods to collect and produce information on subjects who have been deliberately or 
                                                          
10 James Hathaway and Jason Pobjoy, ‘Queer Cases Make Bad Law’ (2012) 44 International Law and Politics 
315.  
11 HJ (Iran) and HT (Cameroon) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] UKSC 31, [2011] 1 AC 
596. 
12 James Hathaway and Jason Pobjoy, ‘Queer Cases Make Bad Law’ (2012) 44 International Law and Politics 
315, 331;335.  
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accidentally excluded from traditional studies of human behaviour. The queer 
methodology…refuses the academic compulsion toward disciplinary coherence.13 
Unpacking Halberstam, we can see that central to a queer approach is creating space to allow 
for those previously ignored to be accounted for and, through doing this, the disruption of the 
assumptions underlying a discourse.14  
Orientation, Behaviour, Identity  
One of the assumptions which must be disrupted in order to understand the specific issues 
facing sexual minority asylum seekers is the assumed coherence of sexuality. Savin-Williams 
argues that the term sexuality conflates sexual identity, sexual orientation and sexual 
behaviour.15 He draws on a series of examples such as that of a girl, who publicly declares 
herself a lesbian; has a bi-sexual orientation, because she is attracted to males and females; 
and has presently had sex with only one person, a boy.16 As this example demonstrates, there 
are times where there is no coincidence between identity, orientation, and behaviour at all. 
This issue plays out in the lived experiences of many sexual minorities. For example, some 
men may consider themselves gay as they are emotionally attracted to individuals of the same 
sex, while lacking any sexual attraction at all.17  
 Considering the structure of the credibility determination process, it appears that law 
is concerned with protecting sexual identity.18 Therefore, the term sexual identity has been 
deployed in this paper when discussing the basis for sexual minority claims. This contrasts 
                                                          
13 Jack Halberstam, ‘Female Masculinity’ (Duke University Press 1998) 13. 
14 Following Foucault, the term discourse is here used to mean any act of communication, whether written, 
spoken, or performed; this includes the structure of legal entities. See: Michel Foucault, ‘Discipline and Punish’ 
(Vintage Books 1995) 233-239.  
15 Rich Savin-Williams, ‘The New Gay Teenager’ (Harvard University Press 2005) 27-48.  
16 Ibid 35.  
17 See: Kirstin Scherrer, ‘Coming to an Asexual Identity: Negotiating Identity, Negotiating Desire’ (2008) 11 
Sexualities 621.  
18 As we will explore later in the chapter.  
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with other scholars who deploy the terms sexuality and sexual orientation to refer to sexual 
minority asylum seekers.19 
 As will be explored below, credibility determinations attempt to assess the legal truth 
of individuals’ claims to be of a certain sexual identity partially in reference to their sexual 
behaviour. Therefore, it is important to recognise a distinction between the protected 
characteristic (sexual identity) and one of the forms of evidence that can support the 
applicants claim to this identity (sexual behaviour). 
 Further, the distinction between orientation, behaviour and identity exposes one of the 
norms to be investigated. Asylum seekers are required to have formed their sexual orientation 
and any sexual behaviour into a coherent identity intelligible to a western audience. This 
requirement is exposed through one tribunal judge’s claim that the claimant displayed ‘a total 
absence of any understanding of what it means to be gay.’20 As this underlies, there is an 
expectation that desire for members of the same sex will formulate into a coherent identity 
with a distinctive meaning. This requirement is further underlined by the various expectations 
that asylum seekers will have interacted with LGB community groups during their time in the 
UK,21 and will be informed on LGB activist organisations within their country of 
nationality.22 Going forward, this chapter lays out the refugee determination process before 
                                                          
19 See For Example: Jenni Millbank, ‘Gender, Sex and Visibility in Refugee Claims on the Basis of Sexual 
Orientation’ (2003) 18 Georgetown Journal of Immigration Law 71; Sheldon Magardie, ‘“Is The Applicant 
Really Gay” Legal Responses to Asylum Claims Based on Persecution Because of Sexual Orientation’ (2003) 
55 Agenda: Empowering Women for Gender Equality 81; Jenni Millbank, ‘“The Ring of Truth”: A Case Study 
of Credibility Assessment in Particular Social Group Refugee Determinations’ (2009) 21 International Journal 
of Refugee Law 1, 1-34; Jasmine Dawson and Paula Greber, ‘Assessing the Refugee Claims of LGBTI people: 
Is the DSSH model useful for determining Claims by Women for Asylum Based on Sexual Orientation’ (2017) 
29 International Journal of Refugee Law 292. 
20 Mr Syed Kazim Hussain Shah v Secretary of State for the Home Department (UKUT IAC, 19 March 2018) 
[16]. 
21 See For example: Mr Get v Secretary of State for the Home Department (UKUT IAC, 13 October 2017); JBN 
v Secretary of State for the Home Department (UKUT IAC, 13 September 2017) [17].  
22 See for example: Jenn Millbank, ‘“The Ring of Truth”: A Case Study of Credibility Assessment in Particular 
Social Group Refugee Determinations’ (2009) 21 International Journal of Refugee Law 1, 19.  
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turning to look specifically at how sexual minority identities are validated within the UK 
asylum apparatus.  
Achieving Refugee Status 
Refugee status is governed by the criteria set down in Article 1 A (2) of the Refugee 
Convention23 as amended by the Protocol on Refugee status.24 Article 1 A (2) states that a 
Refugee is:  
A person who owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, 
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is 
outside the country of his nationality and is unable, or owing to such fear, is unwilling 
to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and 
being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is 
unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.25 
At the time of writing, the proposition that sexual identity can form the basis of an asylum 
claim is uncontroversial, with both the EU26 and UNHCR27 highlighting the fit of sexual 
orientation28 within the ‘Particular Social Group’ (hereafter: PSG) head of the Refugee 
Convention.29 However, it wasn’t until the 1999 case of Shah and Islam that the UK accepted 
the premise that sexual identity could form the basis of a PSG.30 
                                                          
23Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 28 July 1951, 189 UNTS 137. 
24Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 31 January 1967,606 UNTS 267. 
25Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 28 July 1951, 189 UNTS 137, Article 1 (A) 2.  
26Council Directive 2011/95/EU of 13 December 2011 on standards for the qualification of third-country 
nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for 
persons eligible for subsidiary protection, and for the content of the protection granted (recast), 20 December 
2011, OJ L337/26.  
27UN High Commissioner for Refugees, ‘Guidelines on Gender-Related Persecution Within the Context of 
Article 1A (2) of the 1951 Convention and or its 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees 30’, U.N. Doc 
HC/GIP/02/01 (2002). 
28This is the term employed by the bodies themselves.  
29 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 28 July 1951, 189 UNTS 137. 
30Islam v Secretary of State for the Home Department and R v IAT ex p Shah [1999] UKHL 20, [1999] 2 
A.C.629.  
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 Even after accepting that sexual identity based asylum seekers could for a PSG head, 
issues lingered. A useful overview of the key developments in this area is offered by 
Chelvan.31 While Shah and Islam,32 and later in the same year, Jain33 clearly laid out that 
sexual identity—again labelled by the courts as sexual orientation or homosexuality—could 
form the basis for an asylum claim under PSG, the court in Jain went to extreme lengths to 
distinguish conduct from identity. Millbank draws attention to this practice, and its resonance 
with the gay rights struggle in the UK.34 Chelvan has further claimed that ‘The effect of Jain 
was that the court’s understanding of the lives of gay men resulted in a purely “conduct 
driven approach” reducing their lives to the engagement of the sexual act…in the so-called 
‘privacy’ of the bedroom’35 In practice, the distinction between conduct and identity enabled 
claims to be denied on the basis that the claimants could avoid persecution through acting 
discreetly.36 
 This came to be known as the mandatory discretion criterion; which was founded on 
the idea that those seeking asylum on the basis of sexual identity could avoid persecution by 
keeping their sexual identity secret, not visibly manifesting their sexual orientation, and 
conducting their sexual behaviour in private. For example, mandatory discretion was 
described bluntly in an Australian decision as a ‘reasonable expectation that persons should, 
to the extent that it is possible, co-operate in their own protection’37 by acting with ‘self-
                                                          
31 S Chelvan, ‘Put Your Hands Up (If you Feel Love)’ (2011) 25 Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Law 56, 
56-66.  
32Islam v Secretary of State for the Home Department and R v IAT ex p Shah [1999] UKHL 20, [1999] 2 
A.C.629. 
33 Jain v Secretary of State for the Home Department [1999] EWCA Civ 3009, [2000] IMM AR 76.  
34 Jenni Millbank, ‘A Preoccupation with Perversion: The British Response to Refugee Claims on the Basis of 
Sexual Orientation 1989-2003’ (2005) 14 Social and Legal Studies 115.  
35 S Chelvan, ‘Put Your Hands Up (If you Feel Love)’ (2011) 25 Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Law 56, 
57.  
36 See generally: Jenni Millbank, ‘A Preoccupation with Perversion: The British Response to Refugee Claims on 
the Basis of Sexual Orientation, 1989-2003’ (2005) 14 Social and Legal Studies 115. 
37 V95/03527 [1996] RRTA 246, 247.  
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restraint’,38avoiding behaviour that might identify them as gay,39 and never disclosing their 
sexual identity to others.40 Often this line of reasoning was based on a mistaken and 
unchallenged premise that gay people will, or ought to, be inherently discreet.41  
 Following HJ and HT,42 mandatory discretion is no longer available to decision-
makers. Indeed, HJ and HT provided a new test to be applied to claims based on real or 
perceived sexual identity. 43 The test lays out that a decision maker should ‘first ask itself 
whether it is satisfied on the evidence that he is gay’.44 Then ‘ask itself whether it is satisfied 
on the available evidence that gay people who lived openly would be liable to persecution in 
the applicant’s country of nationality’45. Thirdly, they should consider ‘what the individual 
applicant would do if he were returned to that country.’46  
 Following this test, if the applicant either would live openly, or would live discreetly 
due to a fear of persecution, they qualify as a Refugee and are entitled to the protections 
promised under the Convention. Crucially, this means that decision makers are no longer 
permitted to compel a claimant to be discreet, rather they may only decide that they would do 
so as a matter of fact. However, under the new test, the first task confronting a decision 
maker is to ascertain whether the applicant’s sexual identity is credible.  
 In sexual identity claims, as in all other asylum claims, the burden of proving their 
eligibility for Convention protection lies with the claimant. Decision-makers have claimed 
                                                          
38 R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department ex p Binbasi [1989] Imm AR 595 (QB) [5]. 
39 Jain v Secretary of State for the Home Department [1999] EWCA Civ 3009, [2000] IMM AR 76 [9]. 
40 R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department ex p Binbasi [1989] Imm AR 595 (QB).   
41 Jenni Millbank, ‘From Discretion to Disbelief: Recent Trends in Refugee Determinations on the Basis of 
Sexual Orientation in Australia and the United Kingdom’ (2009) 13 International Journal of Human Rights 391, 
392. 
42 HJ (Iran) and HT (Cameroon) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] UKSC 31, [2011] 1 AC 
596.  
43 Ibid [82-83]   
44 Ibid [82].  
45 Ibid [82].   
46 Ibid [82].  
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that sexual identity asylum claims are ‘easy to make and impossible to disprove’.47 However, 
Millbank has highlighted the peculiar evidentiary position sexual minority asylum seekers are 
placed in. She argues that the lack of objective evidence available to prove an individual’s 
sexual identity means such claims end up being largely narrative based.48 This means that the 
success of a claim is often dependent on the ability of the claimant to articulate their narrative 
in terms comprehensible to the decision maker.  
The Credibility Determination Process  
Due to the narrative driven nature of such claims, the key to the success of a claim often lies 
in the credibility findings made by the decision maker. This is recognised by UNHCR who 
state that credibility assessments are a ‘core element of the adjudication of asylum 
applications.’49 
 Millbank identifies two distinct types of consistency operating within the credibility 
determination process, internal and external.50 Internal consistency, assesses the asylum 
seeker’s narrative for coherence, with credible narratives being those which have narrative 
consistency.51 While this can be problematic, particularly considering the impact of trauma 
on memory,52 this chapter focuses exclusively on external consistency. External consistency 
relates to how the narrative corresponds to external criteria. Millbank is critical of the 
                                                          
47Krasniqi v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2001] UKIAT 01TH02140 [2]. 
48 See Generally: Jenni Millbank, ‘“The Ring of Truth”: A Case Study of Credibility Assessment in Particular 
Social Group Refugee Determinations’ (2009) 21 International Journal of Refugee Law 1; Laurie Berg & Jenni 
Millbank, ‘Constructing the Personal narratives of Lesbian, Gay and Bisexual Asylum Claimants [2009] Journal 
of Refugee Studies 195.  
49 UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Beyond Proof, Credibility Assessment in EU Asylum 
Systems: Full Report, May 2013, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/519b1fb54.html [accessed 18 May 
2018], 13.  
50 Jenni Millbank, ‘“The Ring of Truth”: A Case Study of Credibility Assessment in Particular Social Group 
Refugee Determinations’ (2009) 21 International Journal of Refugee Law 1, 11.  
51 Ibid 11.  
52 Jane Herlihy, Peter Scragg and Stuart Turner, ‘Discrepancies in Autobiographical Memories – Implications 
for the Assessment of Asylum Seekers: Repeated Interview Studies’ (2002) 324 British Medical Journal 324.  
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tendency of external consistency assessments to blur into plausibility assessments.53 Indeed, 
following Y v SSHD, decision-makers are entitled to regard a claimants account as lacking in 
credibility based on their own ‘common sense’.54 
 The problem posed by external consistency based credibility assessments for sexual 
identity claims is well put by Lord Hope in HT and HJ, where he observes that  
Behaviour which reveals one’s sexual orientation, whether one is gay or straight, 
varies from individual to individual. It occupies a wide spectrum, from people who 
are naturally reticent and have no particular desire to establish a sexual relationship… 
to those who wish… to proclaim in public their sexual identity.55 
As Lord Hope’s statement exposes, there are no objective criteria against which an 
individual’s sexual identity can be judged. This means that sexual and social behaviour are 
often deployed as a means of assessing the credibility of a claim. As Raj identifies, ‘Emotion, 
desire and feeling are obscured by largely ethnocentric administrative methods of 
verification… which produces a caricatured, stereotyped and overdetermined legal trope of 
the gay or lesbian asylum seeker.’56 
Governing the production of these ‘legal tropes’ are normative ideas about the nature, 
performance, and status of sexual identity. Both Bruce-Jones and Millbank identify the 
requirement for asylum seekers to present their identities in a manner consistent with the 
                                                          
53 Jenni Millbank, ‘“The Ring of Truth”: Credibility Assessment in Particular Social Group Refugee 
Determinations’ (2009) 21 International Journal of Refugee Law 1, 11-16.  
54 Y v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2006] EWHC 122, [2006] All ER 395.  
55 HJ (Iran) and HT (Cameroon) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] UKSC 31, [2011] 1 AC 
596 [22] (Lord Hope)  
56 Senthorun Raj, ‘Affective Displacements: Understanding Emotions and Sexualities in Refugee Law’ (2011) 
36 Alternative Law Journal 177, 177.  
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judge’s understandings of sexual identity.57 Fassin furthers this, arguing that ‘the refugee 
question has been tightly circumscribed in recent years by normative ideas of ‘truth’.58  
Normative Standards  
The use of external markers to identify ‘credible’ sexual identity claims effectively means 
that individual’s identity performances are assessed by reference to normative truth criteria. It 
is only when the identity is performed with a sufficient familial resemblance to western and 
heteronormative understandings of sexual identity that the asylum seeker will be understood 
as credible.  
 Of course, in the search for external criteria against which to judge the credibility of 
an individual’s performance of sexual identity, law has few answers. This is because, ‘What 
counts as legal knowledge, or knowledge for law, is something that changes over time. And 
this mainly happens outside the courtroom’.59 In order to identify the norms with which 
performances must conform, we need to look outside of law, and specifically we must look to 
discourse. As Hardy recognises, 
The refugee subject is a product of processes of determination that lead to his or her 
classification as well as the broader discourses that impinge on and overlap with 
refugee discourse… There is, then, no autonomous subject: a refugee only exists in so 
far as he or she is recognized by others.60 
This means that the metrics through which credibility is assessed have themselves been 
produced. This production occurs both in the asylum apparatus, which has the ability to shift 
                                                          
57 Eddie Bruce-Jones, ‘Death Zones, Comfort Zones: Queering the Refugee Question’ (2015) 22 International 
Journal on Minority and Group Rights 101, 114; Jenni Millbank, ‘“The Ring of Truth”: A Case Study of 
Credibility Assessment in Particular Social Group Refugee Determinations’ (2009) 21 International Journal of 
Refugee Law 1. 
58 Didier Fassin, ‘The Precarious Truth of Asylum’ (2013) 25 Public Culture 39, 41.  
59 David Nelken, ‘Getting at Law’s Boundaries’ (2006) 15 Social and Legal Studies 598, 602.  
60 Cynthia Hardy, ‘Refugee Determination: Power and Resistance in Systems of Foucauldian Power’ (2003) 35 
Administration & Society 462, 467-468. 
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the meaning and nature of sexual identity, and within society more broadly.  In recognising 
this, it is pertinent to bear in mind Nelkin’s reflection that courts often draw on different 
forms of knowledge depending on the verdict they wish to reach.61 Therefore, it should be 
borne in mind that certain constructions of sexual identity may reflect the ideologies of 
individual decision makers—or the impact of certain political sympathies—as well as the 
apparatus more broadly.  
 Raj has identified that ‘The interrogation of credibility- in relation to the veracity of 
an asylum seeker’s sexual orientation- has reproduced ethnocentric ideas of both 
(homo)sexual identity and intimacy’.62 However, he does not account for the exact norms 
through which credibility is determined. This chapter attempts to plug that gap by 
investigating the discourses through which credibility is determined, charting them overt the 
next three sections under the headings ‘born-this-way’, ‘I’m coming out: I want the world to 
know', and ‘I kissed a girl and I liked it.’ 
Born-This-Way  
Born-this-way has become synonymous with western gay rights struggles. Johnston defines 
the born-this-way phenomenon as the ‘political and quasi-scientific claims that sexual 
orientation and gender identity are immutable and intrinsic facts.’63 Born-this-way was 
originally deployed as a stance in debates around whether sexual identity was biologically or 
socially constructed, providing an innate status to which rights claims could be tethered. Even 
within the context of Refugee Law, the born-this-way narrative has been productive, 
providing sexual identity claims with the underlying innate status necessary to found them as 
                                                          
61 David Nelken, ‘Getting at Law’s Boundaries’ (2006) 15 Social and Legal Studies 598, 601.  
62 Senthorun Raj, ‘Queering Fears: Pro-LGBTI Refugee Cases’ in Chris Ashford, Alan Reed and Nicola Wake 
‘Legal Perspectives on State Power: Consent and Control’ (Cambridge Scholars Publishing 2016) 132, 142.  
63 Tim Johnston, ‘Beyond “Born This Way”’ (2015) 5 PhiloSPOHIA 140, 140.  
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a characteristic protected under the Refugee Convention.64 This is because, as Hathaway 
identifies ‘Whatever the common characteristic that defines the group, it must be one that the 
members of the group either cannot change or should not be required to change.’65   
However, in many individual asylum cases the idea that sexual identity is an innate 
characteristic—which manifests itself in a fixed manner—has proved to be an obstacle to 
those attempting to provide a credible narrative of their sexual identity. Indeed, it is possible 
to conceptualise the born-this-way narrative as a myth in the terms of Nancy, who argues that 
‘myth arises only from a community and for it: they engender one another, infinitely and 
immediately’.66 To draw this out a little, the born-this-way narrative, regardless of its factual 
basis, has now become a foundational myth of modern LGB identities—meaning that only 
those conforming to the myth now possess normative intelligibility. Or, in the language of 
asylum, present a credible narrative.  
 The born-this-way narrative links to a number of expectations which expose 
themselves during Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) hearings relating to 
sexual identity. Firstly, the narrative’s impact can be seen in the incredulity towards 
applicants who have had previous sexual partners of the opposite sex,67 or those who have 
had children.68 This links to the expectation that the individual has always been, and been 
aware of, the sexual identity they claim. Thus, negative credibility inferences are drawn from 
anything that contradicts this expectation – such as a sexual history with members of the 
opposite sex.  
                                                          
64 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 28 July 1951, 189 UNTS 137. 
65 James Hathaway, ‘The Law of Refugee Status’ (Butterworths 1991) 160. 
66 Jean-Luc Nancy, ‘The Inoperative Community’ (University of Minnesota Press 1991) 57.  
67 See for Example: Submission of a Senior Presenting Officer in a case involving a Mongolian Lesbian, 2002. 
Cited in: Barry O’Leary, ‘“We Cannot Claim Any Particular Knowledge of The Ways of Homosexuals, Still 
Less of Iranian Homosexuals…” The Particular Problems Facing Those Who Seek Asylum on The Basis of 
Their Sexual Identity’ (2008) 16 Feminist Legal Studies 87, 89.  
68 Ibid.  
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 The born-this-way narrative also troubles those whose claims hinge on culturally 
relative experiences of sexual minority status. This is because implicit in the premise that we 
are ‘born-this-way’—with a fully-formed, pre-social sexual identity—Is the idea that sexual 
identity is universal. Crucially, if sexual identity is understood in universal terms then it is 
understood as being expressed in the same way regardless of the cultural or social 
background that an individual comes from. This can pose serious issues for those whose 
claims are not articulated in terms known to western audiences. For example, ‘Syrian 
refugees may refer to themselves as Lutti. This is a common word that translates as “faggot” 
and is sometimes used by Syrian refugees from rural areas to describe their own sexuality.’69 
When deploying these terms, asylum claimants may be considered to be either lacking in 
credibility for using homophobic language or suffering from internalised homophobia.70 
Which, even if it does not undermine their claim to asylum, functions to erase their identity 
and supplant it with a western one.  
 The science is still out on whether it is biology or society that is responsible for 
differing sexual identities. until we have a definitive answer to the question of exactly what it 
is that results in sexual identities—and can account for every possible manifestation these 
may take—it is anathema to justice to speculate about whether or not someone’s identity is 
credible by referring to criteria wrapped up in the born-this-way narrative.  
 Without venturing more than is necessary into the terrain of the essentialist-
constructionist binary, it is worth noting that even moderate essentialists, who believe that the 
orientation aspect of minority sexual identities is biological, do not deny the potential for 
social factors to produce different performances of sexual identity. For example, Wilkerson’s 
                                                          
69 Nof Nassier-Edin, Nour Abu-Assab, Aydan Greatrick, ‘Reconceptualising and Contextualising Sexual Rights 
in the MENA Region: Beyond LGBTQI Categories’ (2018) 26 Gender and Development 173,184.  
70 Ibid, 184.  
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emerging fusion thesis postulates that while it is desire that leads individuals to choose to 
adopt a sexual identity, no individual knows of their desire prior to socialisation and 
therefore, the ability to discern where biology ends, and socialisation begins, is lost to us.71 
Given this, and the aims of the Refugee Convention,72 more scope must be provided for the 
recognition of cultural difference in the performance of sexual identities. 
I’m Coming Out: I want the world to know 
One of the core areas where cultural differences arise is in ability to and attitudes towards 
‘coming out’. As already explored, prior to HJ and HT asylum seekers faced pressure from 
the UK to hide their identities to avoid persecution.73 Since the discretion test was ruled to be 
unlawful, this pressure has reversed, with only those who publicly articulate their identity 
deemed credible when it comes to applying for refugee status.  
 The need to be ‘out’ and visible is manifested through two routes. Firstly, if a 
claimant is naturally discreet and would not wish to publicly proclaim their identity then HJ 
and HT has left the door open to finding that as a matter of fact the claimant would avoid 
having a well-founded fear of persecution by being discreet.74 In essence, this provision 
targets those that Lord Hope termed ‘naturally reticent’,75 giving a limited power for 
decision-makers to determine that individuals would be discreet, without the ability to 
compel them to do so. Secondly, those who do not visibly manifest their sexual identity will 
struggle to dispense with the evidentiary burden required to prove their identity. 
                                                          
71 William Wilkerson, ‘Ambiguity and Sexuality: A Theory of Sexual Identity’ (Palgrave Macmillan 2007) 106.  
72 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 28 July 1951, 189 UNTS 137. 
73 HJ (Iran) and HT (Cameroon) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] UKSC 31, [2011] 1 AC 
596. 
74 Ibid, [82].  
75 Ibid, [22]. 
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 These two pressures, as other scholars have pinpointed, result in a need for asylum 
seekers to visibly manifest their identity.76 In effect, this produces a need for asylum seekers 
to ‘come out’ if they are to succeed in their asylum claim. This can present great difficulties 
for those who come from cultures in which sexual identity is manifested in a different manner 
to its UK iteration. Problems can also arise for those whose country of origin has alternative 
ideas of the public/private divide. Indeed, the need for visibility can often result in denial for 
those who were not out in their countries of origin.77 
 One way in which asylum seekers can demonstrate their visibility is through attending 
LGB venues and organisations.78 Indeed, claimants were met with incredulity when they 
were unable to demonstrate a sufficient series of links to gay social spaces, charities and 
support groups.79 Despite the fact that, as Millbank identifies, some of us are just ‘home-
bodies’ who do not have any particular desire to go out and socialise in such venues.80 Vogler 
has rightly called out the expectation for potentially traumatised subjects to attend such 
venues as an act which punishes asylum seekers for displaying a symptom of fear and 
persecution.81 
 Alongside the need to attend particular venues, the recognition of an individual as 
credible in their identity also relies on the possession of certain knowledges about queer 
communities and entities commonly assumed to be a part of queer culture. Morris provides a 
framework through which issues of assumed knowledge, such as those arising in the context 
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of credibility determinations, can be theorised. His framework of Gay Capital argues that 
certain gay (middle-class) men have access to particular forms of symbolic, social, and 
cultural capital which can enhance their ability to achieve social recognition.82 For example, 
he highlights how having knowledge of gay popular culture such as RuPaul’s Drag Race 
helped some of his participants to form stronger friendship networks.83 In a similar register, it 
is possible to understand the focus on claimants’ knowledge of gay culture, gay venues, and 
gay organisations—and in one particularly egregious Canadian example, Oscar Wilde84— as 
a requirement for sexual identity asylum seekers to possess a certain amount of gay capital in 
order to present as credible. 
Morris’s framework built on the work of Bourdieu,85 Giametta has pinpointed the 
appropriateness of a Bourdieusian analysis as a way of understanding the impact of different 
forms of capital on the experiences of LGB asylum seekers.86 In effect, a Bourdieusian 
analysis demonstrates that the construction of truth in regard to sexual identity based claims 
is dependent on the possession of particular forms of knowledge—or capital—which enable 
the perspective asylum seeker to render themselves visibly queer—or more commonly visibly 
homonormative.87 Being able to make one’s self visibly ‘out’ is, even in the post discretion 
landscape, key to being recognised as a refugee.  
‘I kissed a girl: and I liked it’ 
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The final prism this chapter will explore are the expectations governing what kinds of sexual 
behaviour form the basis of a credible sexual identity. Here, expectation exists both in terms 
of sexual activity which undermines one’s claim to a particular sexual identity (such as a 
sexual history with members of the opposite sex or having had children) and sexual activity 
which is required to provide evidence for one’s claimed sexual identity. Consideration also 
needs to be given to the circumscribing of asylum seeker’s emotional responses to intimacy.  
 As already outlined in the section on Orientation, Behaviour and Identity, it is by no 
means a given that sexual identity, sexual orientation and behaviour will correspond 
perfectly—or in fact, at all—within any individuals life. Therefore, the expectation that they 
will align within the lives of individuals whose country of nationality strictly policies sexual 
freedom is particularly onerous.  
 Nonetheless, there appears to be an expectation that individuals will be able to 
evidence their sexual identity with reference to sexual behaviour. For example, in one hearing 
the judge noted that the claimant ‘did not current have a long-term partner’88 as something 
which undermined his credibility. Another judge noted that the claimant had lived in the UK 
for approximately 13 years and had produced no evidence of any romantic or sexual 
relationship with a man during this time.89 As these cases demonstrate, decision-makers 
attempt to utilise sexual behaviour as evidence for asylum seekers sexual identities.  
References to sexual behaviour appear with alarming frequency throughout Upper 
Tribunal cases. In one judgement the judge even went so far as to state that, 
Any potential persecutor is on a simple basis likely to consider men who have sex 
with men as gay, and men who do not have sex with other men as not being gay. 
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Therefore, there is a real question mark as to whether or not the appellant would be 
perceived by any potential persecutor as gay.90 
What this view elides are the multitude of other ways in which an individual’s sexual identity 
can be revealed or imputed. For example, one claimant argued that if he were returned to his 
country of origin he would be forced to marry.91 This situation also captures others who 
remain in their countries of origin, facing social pressures to marry, to have children, and to 
perform a heterosexual narrative. Chelvan draws attention to this requirement, pointing out 
that non-normative sexual identities tend to become increasingly visible over time. This, he 
argues, is because the requirements of normative behaviour become more onerous with age.92 
Giametta stresses that, in his study, one of the primary ‘strategies of survival’ adopted by 
those seeking to hide their sexual identity in their country of origin was heterosexual 
marriage.93Therefore, far from being about who an individual has sex with, what a persecutor 
considers to make someone different enough to constitute a legitimate target for persecution 
is a complex question enmeshed in a web of social relations.  
 Upper Tribunal cases and existing academic literature highlight the requirement for 
claimants to manifest their sexual desires in a consistent and fixed way. Despite the fact that a 
natural part of being ‘discreet’ about one’s sexual identity will be performing the ‘false’ 
sexual identity in a manner believable to the society within one’s country of origin. O’Leary 
even documents a senior Home Office Presenting Officer stating that ‘The Appellant cannot 
be a lesbian, as she has had a relationship with a man and had a child with him.’94 As this 
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shows, the current expectation of the asylum apparatus is that sexual identity is dependent on 
a fixed and unchanging sexual orientation which manifests in monosexual behaviour. This is 
expected despite the fact that the claimant is applying from a context in which openly 
expressing their sexual desires (or failing to express normative desires with sufficient 
intensity) could bring about severe consequences.  
The focus on presenting a fixed and consistent sexual narrative also leads to issues for 
those with bisexual or otherwise non-monosexual identities. This is manifested in the fact that 
bisexual claimants have a reduced chance of success when compared to their monosexual 
counterparts.95 There is a need for further research into the additional issues bisexual asylum 
seekers face. However, that is beyond the scope of this chapter.96 
 The framing of rejected sexual identity claims based on bisexuality is potentially 
telling, with decision-makers making a great deal of the idea that claimants could choose to 
only indulge the heterosexual component of their attractions.97 Similarly, the language of 
judges making decisions which applied the now disavowed discretion criterion framed the 
ability of both gay men, lesbians, and bisexual people to be open about their identity as 
‘flaunting’98 or ‘indulging’.99 
 Putting aside the direct issues with the focus on sexual behaviour, tribunal decisions 
also reveal strong expectations in relation to the emotional experiences of sexual minorities to 
their sexual encounters. For example, one Upper Tribunal judge stated that  
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 the Appellant lacked all credibility because he was asked on three occasions during 
his asylum interview “to describe his emotional reaction to his first experience with 
Claire, his first with a transgender woman and the Appellant was unable to do so 
because his responses were “entirely focused on his physical, sexual acts”100 
As this passage shows, the normative demands on asylum seekers exist not just in respect of 
the content of their narratives, but also in respect of their emotional responses to the things 
that have happened to them. As Raj identifies, ‘the extent to which queer refugees have been 
granted protection has been contingent on whether they subscribe to (hetero)normative ideas 
of intimacy, identity and injury.’101  
Sexual Identity as Performativity  
One route out of the issues raised by this chapter could be to adopt a more performative 
understanding of sexual identity. As O’Leary argues, ‘of all the problems identified, the lack 
of understanding of sexual identity and its reduction to sexual conduct is the hardest to 
overcome.’102 However, this reduction is not simply something which takes place within 
tribunals and Home Office interviews. Rather, it is something prevalent throughout the 
current public discourse on sexual identity. It may be that, in fact, the best way to improve the 
situations encountering sexual identity asylum seekers is to alter public perceptions of sexual 
identity itself. While this would not be a panacea, it is argued that such a switch could 
dramatically improve outcomes for sexual minority asylum seekers.   
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Raj strikingly identifies that, in reinforcing the need to assess the credibility of asylum 
seeker’s sexual identities ‘The demand for authenticity was reproduced rather than repudiated 
and the court was able to pull away from facing the fact that all sexualities were 
performative.’103 Despite this, little of the research currently addressing sexual identity 
asylum claims has considered the potential of a wider shift in our framing of sexual identity 
towards a recognition of its performative nature.  
 Butler has explicated the idea of performativity in respect of gender.104 Her argument 
centres on the idea that that identity categories are socially constructed through the repeated 
performance of social scripts.105 Crucial to Butler’s argument is a recognition that the 
constant reiteration of these scripts results in an erasure of their constructed status—meaning 
they come to be held up as pre-existing entities with ontological status.106 To put this in 
another way, they are seen as free-standing categories which fit people, rather than as shared 
affectations which are produced in and through their performance.  
 Recognising this demonstrates the problematic nature of external consistency within 
asylum credibility determinations. The continued repetition of scripted performance, as a 
means to be recognised as credible in your own claim, itself entrenches the requirements for 
those who follow you in the process. This is why it is important, that, as Bruce-Jones’s 
account stresses, the power of asylum hearings to rearticulate the boundaries of different 
categories is recognised.107 By this I mean, if a certain behaviour is repeatedly expressed by a 
social group, that behaviour will itself be added to the recognised representation of that 
group; it will become an expected part of a credible performance. This is performativity at its 
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most simple, the performance itself creates the thing which is to be performed. Therefore, 
how individuals present their identities within asylum claims itself shapes how those 
identities are perceived, understood, and constructed. 
 In effect, the current essentialist framing of sexual identity, means that as  
 Spijkerboer articulates,  
Sexualities which deviate from the dominant norm are only comprehensible if they 
take a particular form. This is most easily visible in credibility assessment[s]…LGBT 
people are assigned to a specific and quite narrow space where we can be LGBT—but 
only one category at a time, preferably for life, and only to the extent they identify 
with one of those exact categories.108  
In order to create space for queer asylum, and to render it possible for those who have non-
normative or non-western sexual identities to benefit from the protections promised in the 
Refugee Convention109, I argue that there is a need to recognise the potential for certain 
aspects of sexual identity to be socially constructed and therefore culturally relative.  
Conclusion  
Deploying a queer analytical framework, this chapter has presented an analysis of the 
discourses informing the production of legal truth when tribunals are asked to assess the 
credibility of an individual’s claim to be of a certain sexual identity. In undertaking this 
analysis, I have sought to disrupt the idea that the deployment of western phenomena is a just 
and objective means of producing that truth. In doing this, I have devoted specific attention to 
deployments of essentialism, visibility and identity/conduct conflation.  
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The chapter argued that adopting a performative understanding of sexual identity can 
enable decision-makers to make space for queer modalities within the asylum apparatus. 
Crucially, I have highlighted how the existing methods of truth production are incompatible 
with queer realities—failing to account for the fluidity of sexual identity, and the impact of 
social expectations on individual narratives. In response to these issues I have proposed the 
adoption of a more performative understanding of sexual identity at the societal level. While I 
do not think this would address the various issues confronting those claiming asylum on the 
basis of their sexual identity, I do think that it would aid their claims in being recognised and 
understood as credible and would therefore be a step along the long path we still have to 
travel.  
 
